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Abstract  
Economic interactions are often accused of being neutral, or even of generating adverse effects, 
not  only  on  the  social  fabric  but  also  on  a  factor  (social  capital)  which  is  regarded  as  the 
foundation of both socio-economic activity and prosperity. In this paper we document how a 
particular form of economic interaction (affiliation of marginalised producers to a first level 
association and to the fair trade import channel) has indeed positive effects on a specific type of 
social capital. Our findings on a sample of Kenyan farmers show that years of affiliation to Fair 
Trade significantly affect the participation in elections and the trust placed in trade unions, 
political parties and the government, net of the impact of other controls and after accounting for 
the selection bias effect. This implies that consumers buying fair trade products contribute to 
reinforce both social cohesion and the institutions in countries in which these variables are 
fundamental in creating room for manoeuvre for pro-poor (equity plus growth) policies.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Social capital is a multi-faceted concept. Depending on the different contexts, it may refer to trust 
and trustworthiness in interpersonal relationships, civic sense, trust in institutions and willingness 
to pay for public goods. 
The  role  of  social  capital  is  increasingly  coming  to  the  forefront  since  economists  have 
acknowledged  its  importance  in  promoting  well-being  and  growth  in  many  theoretical  and 
empirical contributions
3: social capital may help to sustain cooperation, reduce market failures as 
well as negative externalities and conflicts of interests. On the other hand, individuals who dispose 
of a larger stock of social capital usually seem to be healthier and happier.
4 
Many studies therefore document that trust (one of the two most used dimensions of social capital 
together  with  organisation  membership)  is  a  “lubricant”  (Arrow,  1974)  of  the  socio-economic 
system, although not all types of trust and social connections are equally beneficial for economic 
well-being  and  equally  useful  to  create  a  prosperous  society  with  rising  social  efficiency  and 
economic performance.  
In  this  respect,  an  important  distinction  (which  runs  parallel  to  that  between  “bridging”  and 
“bonding” associations) must be made between “particularised” and “generalised” trust. 
When trust is “specific” or “placed in people one has repeated interactions with.” (Knack and 
Keefer,  1997,  p.1258)  and  when  (bonding  but  not  bridging)  associations  are  mainly  oriented 
                                                 
3   Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) find that the level of trust in a given country has 
positive effects on economic growth at aggregate level. Putnam (1993) and La Porta et al. (1997 and 1999) highlight 
the role of trust in improving government performance. Brown and Ashman (1996) state that different forms of social 
capital are central to solving development problems through cooperation. Becchetti and Pace (2006) and Fullenkamp 
and Chami (2002) analyse the positive effects of trust and trustworthiness on firm productivity. Krishna and Uphoff 
(1999), find a positive and significant relationship between superior development outcomes and an index of social 
capital variables. At the aggregate level, it has been shown that the reverse of trust (absence of tolerance or, even 
worse, ethnic conflicts) prevents the development of economic relationships among individuals belonging to different 
ethnic groups and is therefore one of the microeconomic causes of poor economic performance. Contributions at 
micro and macro level on the effects of particular forms of intra-group lack of trust, such as social heterogeneity and 
ethnicity,  on  economic  prosperity  have  been  developed,  among  others,  by  Alesina,  Baqir  and  Easterly  (1999), 
Gradstein and Justman (2002), Gradstein (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a and 2005b). 
 
4    Rose (2000), in an empirical analysis in Russia, finds that the involvement or exclusion from formal and 
informal networks and trust depends on significant social capital. Arts and Halman (2004) argue that individual stocks 
of social capital, mostly in the form of trust, are significantly affected by welfare characteristics and designs: fairer 
systems encourage social capital accumulation.   4 
towards the promotion of the well-being of their members, without considering the effects on non-
members, the effect on social cohesion and prosperity may be low, or even negative.  
On  the  contrary,  the  effect  on  aggregate  well-being  is  expected  to  be  great  when  trust  is 
“generalised”, or “goes beyond the boundaries of kinship and friendship and even beyond the 
boundaries of acquaintance” (Stolle and Rochon, 1998, p. 48) and includes “trusting most (but not 
all) people you do not know or know anything about” (Berggren and Jordal, 2006, p.143), and 
when members of a (bridging) association care about the effects of their actions on non-members 
(or even have their welfare as their goal).
 5 
 
After discovering the importance of trust in its different specifications, economists started being 
interested in identifying the factors which might influence this variable and through it, indirectly, 
economic development. 
On this issue, a well-established opinion highlights an important paradox: trust is fundamental for 
the  economic  system  but  some  features  of  market  economics  (labour  mobility,  anonymity  of 
interactions,  individualism)  may  erode  and  not  reinforce  trust.
6  Hence,  the  risk  for  the  socio-
economic system is that of endangering its very foundations.  
 
In our paper we identify a channel through which economic activity and economic transactions 
may reinforce and not erode social capital. More specifically, we demonstrate that the “socially 
responsible”  consumption  of  fair  trade  products  may  produce  positive  effects  on  trust  in  the 
                                                 
5   Examples in which given forms of social capital do not necessarily encourage socio-economic actions - since 
they may be functional to some group or individual, but could cause economic as well as social damages to others - 
are illustrated, among others, by Coleman (1988), Olson (1971) and Schiff  (1999). 
 
6   Polanyi (1944) argues that market economies tend to destroy the net of social relationships that keep society 
together. The labour market induces people to move to where they could earn the most, creating strangers in strange 
lands. Human status rankings have become the product of market forces rather than the result of social norms about 
justice. On a similar line Hirsch (1976) argues that social morality is a “legacy of the pre-capitalist and pre-industrial 
past” (Hirsch 1976: 117) which is fundamental for the functioning of economic transactions. Such a legacy is a stock 
which is depleted by the values (such as individualism and avarice) produced by the market economy itself and by the 
social context in which market economies operate (anonymity, mobility of workers, etc.).    5 
institutions and on political participation for a group of Kenyan marginalised producers affiliated 
to Fair Trade (from now on also FT).  
As described in more detail in section 2, Fair Trade is an innovative value chain which aims to 
provide higher economic value and social benefits to marginalised primary producers. The bundle 
of  social  and  environmental-friendly  characteristics  which  stimulate  demand  of  ethically 
concerned consumers does not include specifically the creation of social capital, but this effect 
may be produced indirectly. In fact, the success of fair trade depends on the virtuous twinning of 
the fair trade importers with a local association of producers. Participation in such an association, 
which complies with fair trade criteria, is very likely to induce the strengthening of the members’ 
social capital and trust as a side effect. However, a relevant question for empirical analysis is the 
following: is this social capital only group specific (bonding) or also generalised (bridging)? 
The answer to this question is particularly relevant also in view of the socio-political conflicts that 
exploded  in  Kenya  after  the  2008  elections 
7  (three  years  after  our  survey)  showing  that  the 
reinforcement of generalised trust in the form of trust in the government, political parties, trade 
unions,  and  supporting  of  associations  which  promote  this  form  of  social  capital,  may  be 
fundamental in Sub-Saharan countries. 
Our consideration is shared by recent contributions to this branch of the literature. By looking at 
the experience of LDCs, Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2000) observe that pro-poor (growth plus 
equity) policies are often hampered not just by lack of moral fibre in governors, but also by lack of 
room for manoeuvre caused by weak institutions and lack of social cohesion.  
Easterly (2000) adds, in a similar perspective, that high-quality institutions - reflected in factors 
such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality, freedom from government expropriation, and freedom 
                                                 
7   The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that “According to government figures, 
the post-election violence has claimed the lives of at least 680 people and displaced another 255,000. However, the local 
media estimates that more than 1,000 people have died. Violence erupted in parts of the country soon after the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya announced President Mwai Kibaki as winner of presidential elections held on 27 December 2007.“ 
  The most remarkable economic consequences of the crisis have been the sharp drop in tourist revenues with an 
estimate of around 150 job losses and a health crisis due to the slowing down and/or interruption of treatments for HIV and 
other illnesses.  
   
   6 
from  government  repudiation  of  contracts  -  mitigate  the  adverse  economic  effects  of  ethnic 
fractionalisation identified by Easterly and Levine (1997). 
These contributions enhance the value that virtuous economic processes may have in reinforcing 
confidence  in  institutions  in  these  difficult  frameworks.  Such  confidence  may  be  crucial  for 
making institutions stronger, thereby avoiding social unrest and promoting economic prosperity.  
Our paper provides an original contribution in this field at a micro level by testing the effect on 
social capital resulting from the participation of marginalised producers to a first level association 
(Meru Herbs) which was created by Fair trade importers and which exports its products through 
them.  Since  the  promotion  of  the  attitude  to  cooperate  within  a  given  organisation  does  not 
necessarily generate positive effects in terms of generalised social capital (and may be oriented 
merely to create benefits for participants at the expense of third parties), the goal of this paper is 
that of testing whether Fair Trade and Meru Herbs affiliation has not only “bonding”, but also 
“bridging” effects. 
The  section  which  follows  will  show  that  fair  trade,  as  mentioned  above,  does  not  have 
straightforward criteria that focus on the goal of reinforcing social capital. However, its approach, 
aimed at supporting virtuous local cooperatives or producers’ associations, may generate this result 
as an indirect effect. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 3 presents the survey 




2. Fair trade characteristics and points for debate 
 
Fair trade is an original value chain in which importers from Europe and the US establish long 
term  relationships  with  associations  of  marginalised  producers  in  LDCs  to  promote  capacity 
building, market inclusion and improvement of local well-being.   7 
IFAT, the international “umbrella” organisation of importers, producers’ associations, and final 
retailers establishes that, in order to obtain the fair trade label, the following criteria need to be 
met: i) Creation of opportunities for economically disadvantaged producers; ii) Transparency and 
accountability; iii) Capacity building; iv) Promotion of Fair Trade; v) Payment of a fair price; vi) 
Gender  Equity;  vii)  Working  conditions  (a  healthy  working  environment  for  producers;  the 
participation  of  children  (if  any)  does  not  adversely  affect  their  well-being  but  security, 
educational requirements and need for play and conforms to the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child as well as the laws and norms in force in the local context); viii) The environment; ix) 
Trade  Relations  (Fair  Trade  Organisations  trade  keeping  in  mind  the  social,  economic  and 
environmental well-being of marginalised small producers and do not maximise profit at their 
expense; they maintain long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect that 
contribute to the promotion and growth of Fair Trade; whenever possible, producers are assisted 
with access to pre-harvest or pre-production advance payment).  
In the fair trade practice these criteria are translated into a series of initiatives which include: i) an 
anti-cyclical mark-up on producer prices including an insurance mechanism which prevents them 
from falling below a certain threshold;
8 ii) anticipated financing schemes; iii) export services; iv) 
direct investment in local public goods (health, education) through contributions provided to the 
local producers’ associations. 
It  has  been  shown  that  such  criteria  may  address  some  typical  market  failures  such  as  credit 
rationing,  under-investment  in  local  public  goods  (health,  education,  professional  training), 
reduction of market power of local intermediaries and/or money lenders (Becchetti and Rosati, 
2006).
9  Finally,  the  market  success  of  these  products  has  been  shown  to  be  able  to  generate 
                                                 
8   An example of Fair Trade price premium is in the banana market. In Ecuador, the 2005 conventional market 
price for 1.14 kilos of bananas was US $2.91, against a FT price of US $7.75. Evidence of FT premium on prices of 
coffee beans and cocoa in the last 20 years is also well known and available from the authors upon request. 
 
9   For a theoretical evaluation of the effects of FT from the perspective of trade theories see Maseland and De 
Vaal (2002). Other relevant papers dealing with various aspects of the impact of FT are those of Moore (2004), Hayes 
(2004) and Redfern and Sneker (2002).   8 
contagion effects which increase corporate social responsibility of profit maximising competitors 
(Becchetti and Solferino, 2008). 
Nevertheless, Fair Trade has been criticised on three main grounds. Firstly, it is said that the 
intermediate good price mark-up is a distortion with respect to the market price and therefore it 
sends the wrong signals to producers, leading to oversupply. Secondly, it has been argued that the 
alternative strategy of buying a traditional product and then transferring to poor beneficiaries an 
amount equivalent to the price differential between the fair trade and the traditional product may 
be welfare enhancing with respect to the fair trade solution (LeClair, 2002). Thirdly, it has been 
conjectured  that  fair  trade  can  create  negative  externalities  on  non-affiliated  local  producers 
(LeClair, 2002). 
Regarding the first point, it has been shown that the anti-cyclical price premium is not a distortion, 
but  an  intervention  which  addresses  specific  market  failures  in  situations  where  local 
intermediaries  and  money  lenders  are  shown  to  have  monopsonic  power  on  marginalised 
producers.
10 Furthermore, it has been argued that the premium on the intermediate price is an 
intangible  factor  which  adds  social  value  and  makes  the  final  FT  product  different  from  the 
standard one, thereby making fair trade a general purpose innovation which increases product 
variety.  
As far as the second point is concerned, it can be argued that charity, in contrast with the “portfolio 
vote” of FT consumers,
11 has no local antitrust effects and does not create contagion among profit 
maximising competitors of fair trade.  
                                                                                                                                                                
 
10   This  has  been  verified  by  Becchetti  and  Costantino  (2008)  for  Meru  Herbs  where  fair  trade  reduced 
dependence of affiliated farmers on Nairobi intermediaries and by Becchetti et al. (2007) in a study on affiliated 
Peruvian wool producers in the Juliaca region (Titicaca lake) where the introduction of fair trade led to an increase in 
their bargaining power with local intermediaries and to the disappearance of an illegal night market. 
 
11   In this respect FT is just the most well known application of the more general principle of consumers’ 
willingness to pay for social issues when they buy products. Other recent interesting examples are the dedicated shops 
in Sicily selling products of entrepreneurs who have decided not to pay fees to the local mafia (“addiopizzo shops”) 
and  all  those  initiatives  in  which  corporations  are  able  to  extract  the  “social  surplus”  from  socially  responsible 
consumers. To quote just one of them, Cathay Pacific adopted a dual pricing policy offering “concerned” consumers a   9 
The third point has been addressed empirically in an impact analysis on the effects of affiliation on 
two different groups of Peruvian producers (Becchetti et al., 2007); it has shown that externalities 
on local non affiliated producers are positive in one case and negative in a second one.   
 
As a result of the above considerations, Fair trade is a new interesting phenomenon which deserves 
empirical investigation, for at least three reasons. 
Firstly, the literature on this topic is very limited, while fair trade is becoming popular in the US 
and in Europe since consumers have started looking not only at prices and quality, but also at the 
social and environmental responsibility of products. In the last years FT has achieved significant 
shares in some market segments (47 percent of bananas in Switzerland and 20 percent of ground 
coffee  in  the  UK)  and  the  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  social  and  environmental 
responsibility revealed in different surveys around Europe indicate values even greater than these 
(Bird and Hughes, 1997; Demos and PI/Coop, 2004; De Pelsmacker et al. 2003).
12  
Secondly, the debate regarding the contribution of this initiative to the producers’ well-being and 
the observance of FT criteria needs to be brought, not only on theoretical, but also on empirical 
grounds. The socially responsible characteristics, which are one of the leading competitive factors 
of FT, are not an “experience good” and, given the asymmetrical information between sellers and 
buyers on this issue, rigorous empirical analyses are required to evaluate whether the FT promises 
are kept and do not create distortions or negative externalities.  
Thirdly, it has been shown that FT impact analyses may contribute to a redefinition of the same FT 
criteria.  In  the  econometric  study  on  the  impact  of  FT  on  Kenyan  farmers,  Becchetti  and 
Costantino  (2008)  show  that  product  risk  diversification  (an  element  not  included  in  official 
                                                                                                                                                                
more expensive air ticket, in which the price differential with respect to the standard one was used to finance the CO2 
reduction policies of the air company.  
 
12   Virtual willingness to pay tends to be higher than the revealed one since the virtual choice between a FT and 
a standard product is easier than  in real life, due to the absence of differences in availability of the two types of 
products and the interviewed consumers' lack of asymmetrical information regarding the ethical characteristics of the 
FT product.    10 
criteria) is one of the main sources of benefits for local affiliated producers. An empirical analysis 
on Peruvian producers (Becchetti et al., 2007) shows that affiliation has a significant effect on 
professional self-esteem and life satisfaction (neither of these are considered among FT criteria). 
Combined results from these two studies also show that, even though FT does not ban child labour 
products, affiliation leads to a reduction of child labour and an increase in schooling for producers 
above a minimum standard of living threshold (around  $3 per day in PPP), but not for those below 
it. 
In the light of what has been considered above, the goal of our research is to produce new evidence 
for this debate by testing a still unexplored potential FT effect: the impact on producers’ social 
capital in the form of trust in institutions, trade unions and political parties. 
The decision to analyse this specific dimension of generalised trust stems from three main reasons. 
Firstly, the instability of the actual political and institutional situation in Kenya,  amplified by 
ethnic fragmentation,
  13 does not help to solve its economic difficulties. In this environment of 
social divergence and conflict, fairness and higher institutions’ credibility, as well as the state-
society synergy, may notably help to create virtuous cycles of social capital accumulation, in the 
form of institutional and generalised trust. Moreover, norms and trust may help to discourage 
opportunistic behaviour and support economic growth and sustainable development.
14 
Secondly,  a  considerable  number  of  empirical  studies  link  social  capital  accumulation  to  the 
effects of institutional or systemic factors (e.g. confidence in the institutions and politics, public 
spirit, cooperation, etc). 
15  
                                                 
13   See, among others, Alesina, Baquir, and Easterly (1999); Alesina and La Ferrara (2000); Goldin and Katz 
(1999) and Fox (1996). 
 
14   “In the absence of trust [..]  opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation would have to be forgone [..] 
norms of social behaviour […could be] reactions of society to compensate for market failures” (Arrow 1971, 22) 
 
15   According to Putnam (1993), the level of trust within communities increases cooperation which, in turn, 
raises generalised trust. In their works, Rothstein and Stolle (2001) similarly to Levi (1996), indicate fairness and 
credibility of governments as key determinants of generalised interpersonal trust.  
   11 
Lastly, current literature tends to investigate trust and cooperation instead of group membership,
16 
as a measure of social capital. Empirical results do not always confirm the statistically significant 
impact of group membership on societies and economies, besides the fact that this measure may 




3. The survey design 
 
The entity which gave birth to the Meru Herbs commercial organisation (created in 1991) is an 
association of farmers (Ng’uuru Gakirwe Water Committee)
  18 that created it in order to raise 
income through the commercialisation of food products and thus be able to afford the canalisation 
of the Kitcheno River. The irrigation project was a successful infrastructural intervention in the 
area  and provided water to local houses and farms, increased fertility and the value of lands and 
reduced the time spent (mainly by women and children) getting access to  water sources.  
Since the very beginning, the commercialisation of food products was carried out through fair 
trade channels as an experimental partnership built up between Meru Herbs and the leading Italian 
Fair Trade importer (CTM).  
Meru  Herbs  intended  to  reduce  the  monopsonistic  power  of  Nairobi  traders  (who  normally 
controlled the commercialisation of products in the region) and facilitate the creation of new trade 
opportunities in order to develop the economy of the local area.  
                                                 
16   Using WVS data from 1990 to 1996, Delhey and Newton (2005) focus on generalised trust at a micro level, 
while Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), as well as Soroka et al. (2003), investigate generalised trust at a macro level. 
Among others, the same variable has been investigated by Bartkowski and Jasińska-Kania (2004), Halman and Luijkx 
(2006), van Oorschot and Arts (2005, 2006) on European data. 
 
17   See e.g. Knack and Keefer (1997). 
 
18   The Committee was set up by 430 families living in various plots (10 to 40 acres) which had been granted by 
the Kenyan Government in the 1960s. The plots are located in the districts of Meru Central and Tharaka, 200 km from 
Nairobi, on Mount Kenya’s eastern slopes. 
   12 
The organisation achieved an organic certification from the British Company Soil Association 
Certification Ltd. in the year 2000 and today it exports 97 percent of net sales through fair trade 
organisations.
19 
The  relationship  between  producers  and  the  organisation  is  such  that  farmers  who  obtain  an 
organic certification (or are in the process of obtaining it) – by signing an affiliation contract with 
Meru Herbs - agree to sell part of their production
20 to the cooperative in exchange of benefits, 
services and technical assistance from the organisation.
21 
The overlap between the use of FT channels to export and the characteristics of the first level 
producer association Meru Herbs, does not allow the separation of FT activity from Meru Herbs 
effects. In fact, both these aspects are part of a unique integrated project. 
 
Our  research in the socio-economic environment described above was developed according to the 
following timetable: i) 1
st February 2005 – Meru Herbs, Nairobi office: beginning of the research; 
ii)  2
nd  –  11
th  February  2005  –  Meru  Herbs  Base  Camp:  community  analysis  and  provisional 
questionnaire checking; iii) 12
th – 20
th February 2005 – Meru Herbs, Nairobi office: data collection 
for the indirect impact study; iv) 21
st of February – 15
th March 2005 – Meru Herbs Base Camp: 
interviews using questionnaires (direct impact study); v) 15
th – 18
th March 2005 – Meru Herbs, 
Nairobi office: end of the research. 
Our reference population is composed of 474 farmers who benefited from the irrigation project. 
The  characteristics  of  this  population  led  us  to  classify  the  farmers  into  four  groups  (Bio, 
                                                 
19   In particular, Meru Herbs exports to the Italian market through Consorzio altromercato (CTM) and Equo 
Mercato (CEM), and in Japan through People Tree. The CTM channel accounts for 80 percent of total Meru Herbs 
exports. 
 
20   The relation between the organisation and affiliated farmers is not exclusive since they also sell no less than 
40 percent of their production locally (directly to customers and local intermediaries). 
 
21   More specifically, Meru Herbs: i) provides complimentary seeds and organic fertilisers to farmers; ii) sells 
them  fruit  trees  for  production  at  subsidised  prices;  iii)  organises  complimentary  training  courses  in  the 
implementation of organic farming techniques, and iv) offers Farmer manager and Vice-manager services to their 
affiliated farmers with the specific task of supervising and providing technical assistance. 
   13 
Conversion, Onlyfruit and Control farmers). Bio farmers are long-term affiliated ones (with more 
than 10-year affiliation) with biological certification on their production. Conversion farmers are 
those that have been affiliated for not more than two years and are undergoing the process of 
conversion to biological production. Onlyfruit farmers are local non-affiliated farmers that have 
trade relationships with Meru Herbs (Table 1); more specifically, they sell fruits to the association 
in order to help increase its economies of scale in distribution and to fill its containers of products 
sold to Fair Trade organisations. As non-members having commercial relationships with fair trade 
importers, they enjoy the price premium but not the specific fair trade effects generated by the 
support of importers to the Meru Herbs association.
22  
The fourth (Control) group is composed of farmers living in the same area with no relationship 
with Meru Herbs and fair trade. 
In this respect, an important advantage of our data is the homogeneity between treatment and 
control groups who live in the same geographical area and share the same benefits arising from the 
irrigation project (higher land value, less time spent for access to water sources, improved yields, 
etc.).  From the universe of the 474 farmers we therefore randomly extract an equal number of 
sample  components  from  each  of  the  four  groups.  Descriptive  features  of  our  sample  are 
documented in the next section. 
 
 
4. Descriptive findings 
 
A first important characteristic of our data is the relationship between years of affiliation and 
affiliation to the four (Bio, Conversion, Onlyfruit and Control) groups. 
As expected, a quarter of the respondents is from the Control sample and therefore has 0 affiliation 
years.  With  regard  to  affiliated  individuals,  we  find  that  a  large  part  of  the  responses  are 
                                                 
22   As in almost all fair trade relationships, part of the fair trade monetary benefit is directly paid to producers, 
while part of it is paid to Meru Herbs to finance the association services to affiliates.   14 
concentrated around the lowest and highest level of non-zero affiliation years (33.33 percent with 
1 year and 21.67 percent with 14 years) (Table 2).  
For this reason, in our  descriptive findings, we look at average values of trust and affiliation 
indexes for three categories (0 affiliation, from 1 to 5 affiliation years, more than 5 affiliation 
years) knowing in advance that the second group will be composed mainly of respondents with 1 
affiliation year, while the third group of respondents with the maximum number of affiliation 
years. 
To sum up, the interaction between the latter classification and the four group taxonomy shows 
that we can completely include the Control group in the “no affiliation” category, while roughly 97 
percent of the Bio group falls into the “more than 6 years” group (87 percent of Bio farmers have 
been affiliated for 14  years). As expected, Onlyfruit and Conversion farmers are found in the 
remaining “1 to 6 years” category (intermediate members from now on). 
The groups considered are quite heterogeneous as far as demographic features are concerned.
23 
Bio farmers, located in the maximum duration of affiliation category (long-term members from 
now on) and in the “1 to 6 years” one, reveal quite similar patterns in age and average monthly 
earnings: they are (ten years) older, (two and a half years) less educated, and have larger families 
(one child more on average) than the Control group (with zero affiliation years) (Table 5). They 
also  exhibit  the  greatest  average  household  monthly  earnings  among  the  groups,  while  the 
intermediate members, which represent the majority of the observations, have the highest number 
of schooling years in the sample (Table 4). 
Control farmers exhibit the lowest average household monthly earnings among the four groups. 
However,  their  families  are  smaller  and,  when  we  equivalise  incomes,
24  we  find  that  the 
                                                 
23   Selected  variable  legend  is  in  Table  3,  while  summary  descriptive  statistics  for  the  same  variables  are 
provided in Table 4. 
 
24   The standard OECD rule used to scale earnings for family size is to divide household income by a scale 
factor A, where A = 1 + 0.5 (Nadults – 1) + 0.3 Nchildren . However, larger weights are generally used in development 
studies considering that large part of consumption is food consumption for which economies of scale in the number of 
members are very limited. We therefore follow the standard suggestion in such cases of giving unit weights to each   15 
differences among the four groups tend to narrow. Becchetti and Costantino (2008) looked into the 
Meru Herbs project to ascertain whether it complies with fair trade criteria (Table 5). They found 
that  one  main  difference  is  that  affiliated  farmers  enjoy  the  benefits  of  higher  product 
diversification,  with  an  average  number  of  products  cultivated  and  sold  equal  to  8.8  for  Bio 
farmers, against 4 of the Control group. More specifically, FT, in cooperation with Meru Herbs, 
has introduced four new products (mango, karkade, guava and lemon) which are cultivated only by 
affiliated farmers.
25 The price premium may be verified on the only product (pilipili, the Swahili 
word for red pepper) which is sold both locally and in the fair trade channel, with the price being 
almost three times higher in the latter. Moreover, affiliated farmers register a significant difference 
in technical assistance (enjoyed by 100 percent of affiliated against 33 percent of non-affiliated).
26  
Becchetti and Costantino (2008) conclude that the combination of higher technical assistance and 





4.1 Descriptive findings on social capital indicators 
 
A first relevant descriptive finding on social capital indicators is that affiliation is significantly 
correlated with a higher participation in political voting (Table 6). Electoral turnout is 93 percent 
for respondents with more than 6 years of affiliation, 86 percent for those in the intermediate group 
                                                                                                                                                                
member (for a discussion of the methodological problems in creating equivalence scales see Deaton and Paxson, 
1998). 
 
25   Consider that karkade is new for Kenya (it comes from Sudan) and was introduced for the first time by Fair 
Trade organisations. Moreover, since 2006 (after our survey, carried out in 2005) FT importers  have introduced 
additional products such as passion fruit and bananas, as well as onions, tomatoes and garlic for the preparation of 
sauces. 
 
26   For the specific characteristics of Meru Herbs technical assistance see footnote 20.   16 
and 69 percent for the control group. The difference between the first and the third group is 24 
percent. 
Affiliation years also seem to affect trust in trade unions, political parties and the government. The 
share of those with the lowest confidence in trade unions is 25 percent among long term  FT 
members, 30 percent among intermediate members and 38 percent among control respondents. 59 
percent of non-members have a total lack of confidence in political parties, against 56 percent of 
intermediate members and 47 percent of long-term members. When we look at the maximum lack 
of confidence in the government, the respective numbers are 10 percent, 13 percent and 3 percent. 
Descriptive evidence therefore seems to show a positive correlation between FT affiliation and a 
specific form of generalised trust (in institutions such as the government, trade unions and political 
parties) which needs to be verified with econometric analysis 
 
5. Econometric specification  
 
Descriptive evidence on the correlation between affiliation years and indicators of trust can be 
affected by various composition effects. As it has already been mentioned, farmers belonging to 
the Bio group tend to be older and less educated than those in the other three groups (Conversion, 
Onlyfruit  and  Control).  If  education  may  be  thought  as  being  positively  correlated  with  trust 
(hence the affiliation year effect may be even larger after verifying the schooling years), age is 
expected  to  be  positively  correlated  as  well  (in  this  case  the  affiliation  year  effect  could  be 
overestimated). In addition to this, heterogeneity in ethnic group, religion, gender, income and 
wealth among sample respondents may also affect the above-mentioned descriptive findings.  
This is one of the main reasons that led us to present econometric estimates on the trust-affiliation 
relationship.  
More specifically, we looked at the impact of affiliation years on the probability of falling into the 
lowest category of trust (no trust at all) in the government, political parties and trade unions. The   17 
rationale for looking at this specific variable is that people exhibiting the lowest level of trust are 
most likely to fuel social unrest and the kind of problems which we saw exploding after our survey 
in Kenya. 
More in detail, we use the following specification with a logit estimate  
  
Trusti = α0 + α1 Workyear + α2 Onlyfruit+ α3 Sons + α4 Man + α5 Catholic + α6 Education +  
α7 Totalincome + α8 Investineducation + α9 Age + α10 Mainactagr + α11 Durablerecbought +  
α12 Dietary + vi 
 [1] 
in which Trusti is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for those who respond that they 
have no trust at all in a given institution (political parties, government and trade unions) and 0 
otherwise. Workyear is the number of years of trade relationship with Meru Herbs, Onlyfruit is a 
dummy  taking  a  value  of  1  if  the  respondent  belongs  to  that  group,
27  Man  and  Catholic  are 
respectively, gender and religion dummies, Education is the total number of schooling years of the 
respondent, Totalincome is the sum of incomes from all working activities, Investineducation is a 
variable measuring the intensity of the respondent’s investment in the education of his children, 
age is the respondent’s age, Mainactivity is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the respondent’s 
main activity is agriculture, Durablerecbought is the number of durable goods purchased by the 
respondent in the last two years (a proxy of wealth) and Dietary is an indicator of the richness of 
the respondent’s diet. In our survey we have information about the frequency of consumption 
(more than once a day, once a day, once every three days, once a week, rarely, never) of the 
following food items: ugali, chapati, rice, maize, beans, eggs, milk, chicken, other meat, fish, 
potatoes, greens, fresh fruit. On this basis we build an index of dietary quality giving descending 
                                                 
27   Given the particular status of Onlyfruit farmers, the variable helps to discriminate between years of Meru 
Herbs affiliation and years of trade relationships.  
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values (from a maximum of 5 to a minimum of 1) to the above-mentioned frequency modalities. 
Finally, we calculate our synthetic index as an average of the values given to each food item. 
We use dietary as an additional proxy of individual well-being since income may be an inadequate 
indicator of the latter as far as poor farmers are concerned because subsistence farming contributes 
significantly to their household resources.  
Our choice of covariates is based on results and specifications typical of this literature.  
Among all the variables considered, income, education and age appear to be the most influential. 
Higher levels of income and education seem to increase the probability of creating trust, while 
income inequality within the population may build generalised distrust towards society.
 28 
Effects are not so clear and uniform when considering institutional trust specifically. Education for 
instance, is shown to affect it in both positive and negative directions.
29 Moreover, the effect of 
education is difficult to quantify since it may also influence trust through non-economic channels 
generating a self-reinforcing process. 
30 
With regard to age, we may intuitively state that older people are more cooperative and trusting, 
but,  again,  empirical  results  do  not  show  homogeneous  results.  Most  empirical  papers  find  a 
positive impact of age on general and institutional trust.
31  
An  alternative  point  of  view  assumes  a  concave  relationship  between  social  capital  and  age: 
getting older first increases and later decreases social capital. Glaeser et al. (2002), show that 
social capital investment declines monotonically with ageing. 
 
 
                                                 
28   On this point see Knack and Keefer (1997), Costa and Kahn (2001), Helliwell and Putnam (1999), Paldam 
(2000) and Denny (2003). 
 
29   See, respectively, Halman and Luijkx (2006) and Oorschot et al. (2005). 
 
30   Education "may help to create a climate of trust that is self-reinforcing" (Helliwell and Putnam 1999: 5). 
 
31   See van Oorschot et al (2005); Whiteley (1999); Halman and Luijkx (2006). 
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5.1 Econometric findings  
 
Results on our first estimate (Table 7, column 1) show that affiliation significantly contributes to 
reducing the probability of falling into the lowest category of trust in the government. The effect of 
affiliation to FT channels is quantitatively weak since 3 years of relationship reduce the probability 
of falling in the lowest trust category by only 1 percent. A similar effect, in terms of sign, but with 
a greater magnitude, is determined by the variable that accounts for the main activity in which the 
respondent  is  working.  Agriculture,  being  the  first  activity,  reduces  by  10.51  percent  the 
probability of distrusting government institutions (the significance is only 90 percent).  
Although  it  has  quite  negligible  quantitative  effects,  the  other  variable  to  be  noted  is  the 
respondents’ age.  Being 12 years older raises the odds of falling into the highest distrust category 
by  1  percent.  Since  the  majority  of  the  observations  in  our  sample  is  represented  by  the 
intermediate members with quite a high average age (around 45 years), we interpret this result in 
the light of the Gleaser (2002) point of view. The majority of observations in fact, may lie on the 
descending curve of the concave relation between social capital and age.
32  
Another statistically significant effect is played by the Catholic religion that seems to be positively 
related to government distrust (being Catholic raises by 3.7 percent the likelihood of not trusting 
the government at all). This result is consistent with the argumentations of Putnam (1993) and La 
Porta et al (1997) who believe that dominant hierarchical religions like, for instance, Catholic or 
Orthodox Christian, lower trust.  
Results on the effects of the affiliation variable on trust in political parties and trade unions are 
equally  significant  but  stronger.  Three  additional  years  of  affiliation  reduce  the  probability  of 
falling into the lowest trust category by 15 and 12 percent respectively (Table 7, columns 2 & 3). 
As far as confidence in political parties is concerned, we can confirm the positive direction of the 
                                                 
32   We tried a non-linear specification with age and age squared but the specification is not significant. Results 
are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.   20 
impact of age, albeit with more powerful effects (every 12 years, odds of falling in the highest 
distrust category increase up to 22 percent) (Table 7, columns 2). 
Finally,  we  observe  that  neither  current  incomes  nor  dietary  and  consumer  durables  show 
statistically significant results. The difference in wealth within the community seems unable to 
explain trust in institutions, political parties and trade unions. The same consideration applies for 
variables which account for the level and importance of education (schooling years and investment 
in education). 
 
5.1 Controlling for the selection bias effect 
 
In empirical analyses like ours, the significant link observed between affiliation to a given group 
and the performance indicator does not necessarily imply that the relationship has been determined 
by the effect of affiliation. In fact it may be that the performance differential between treatment 
and control groups are pre-existent at the moment of affiliation (selection bias). The selection bias 
may be explicit (determined by the group admittance rules) or implicit (ex ante characteristics are 
correlated both with the decision to associate and with the performance indicator).
33 In our case a 
phenomenon of implicit selection would arise if individuals with greater trust in institutions had a 
higher  propensity  to  enter  Meru  Herbs.  In  order  to  control  for  selection  bias  we  estimate  a 
treatment regression model in which the relationship between affiliation length and performance is 
controlled for the characteristics of those who are part of Meru Herbs. 
The treatment regression model includes the following two equations: 
 
Trusti = α0 + α1 Workyear + α2 Onlyfruit+ α3 Sons + α4 Man + α5 Catholic + α6 Education +  
α7 Totalincome + α8 Investineducation + α9 Age + α10 Mainactagr + α11 Durablerecbought +  
                                                 
33   Note that the selection bias effect and the positive contribution of Fair Trade to producers’ well-being are not 
mutually exclusive. By setting high product quality and social standards for members’ access to the cooperative, Fair 
Trade may contribute positively to pre-entry improvement of social and economic indicators.    21 
α12 Dietary + vi 
 [2.1] 
Controli = β0 + β1 Education + β2 Age + β3 Sons + β4 Peopleinhouse + β5 Totalincome zi 
                          [2.2] 
 
In the two-equation system (v) and (z) are bivariate normal random variables with zero mean and a 








. The likelihood function for the joint estimation of [2.1] and [2.2] is 
provided by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003). 
Since the treatment regression model requires a continuous dependent variable we build an (almost 
continuous) weighted index of the responses given to the three questions on trust in government, 
trade unions and political parties.  
Empirical findings (Table column 4) show that the effect of affiliation years is strongly significant 




Fair trade organisations have tried to make the socially and environmentally responsible content of 
their value chain explicit in a list of official criteria. Beyond the myth, fair trade creates links with 
“socially responsible” producers’ associations or cooperatives rather than directly with individual 
farmers. This occurs with the creation of a long term relationship in which fair trade importers 
provide  a  series  of  benefits,  both  directly  to  producers  and  indirectly  to  their  cooperative  or 
association, in order to promote capacity building and inclusion of the former into the market. 
From these specific characteristics it may be inferred that an additional effect of fair trade is that of 
fostering investment in social capital of affiliated producers, by indirectly promoting their attitude 
to associate and cooperate. It must be considered, however, that the promotion of the attitude to   22 
cooperate does not necessarily generate positive effects in terms of generalised social capital. Only 
if  associations  have  “bridging”,  and  not  just  “bonding”  characteristics,  social  capital  may  be 
beneficial at the aggregate level.  
In this paper we investigate this issue by looking at the effects of affiliation years on some specific 
“generalised” social capital indicators such as trust in the government, political parties and trade 
unions.  
Our findings show that affiliation matters for all three of these indicators, net of the impact of all 
other  relevant  controls  and  of  the  implicit  selection  bias  which  may  arise  in  this  type  of 
organisation. 
We believe that our results are particularly interesting for the reasons explained below. The recent 
econometric  literature  has  increasingly  shown  that,  beyond  the  apparent  part  of  the  standard 
economic  indicators  (labour  and  capital  inputs,  productivity,  prices  and  output),  there  is  a 
fundamental hidden part made by intangible inputs (such as social capital) which are crucial in 
determining some of the visible ones (i.e. workers’ productivity). Hence, the investigation of the 
determinants of such invisible components is fundamental to understand economic performance at 
a micro and macro level. The recent literature on development emphasizes the importance of such 
factors even more, by considering social capital and social cohesion as the crucial weak points that 
explain the failures of development policies in Sub-Saharan countries (Easterlin et al., 2000).  
In this respect, we consider our results especially relevant in that they reveal the existence of a 
virtuous link between a specific form of trade and consumption and the development of social 
capital in Kenya some years before the explosion of social unrest which tragically evidenced the 
limits of trust in institutions in this country (and, with it, the belief that a political crisis could be 
solved in a peaceful way).  
The  implicit  policy  suggestion  of  this  paper  is  therefore  that  there  can  be  precious  synergies 
between development policies at country level and “bottom up” initiatives at micro level which   23 
promote the creation of social cohesion and social capital in order to jointly affect material and 







































   24 
References  
 
Alesina  A.,  Baqir  R.,  Easterly  W.  (1997).  Public  Goods  and  Ethnic  Divisions.  The  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 114(4): 1243-1284; 
 
Alesina A., Ferrara E. (2000). The Determinant of Trust. NBER Working Paper 7621; 
 
Arrow  K.  (1971).  Political  and  Economic  Evaluation  of  Social  Effects  and  Externalities.  In 
Frontiers of Quantitative Economics. M. Intriligator; 
 
Arrow K. (1974). The Limits of Organization. Norton, New York, p. 217; 
 
Arts W., Halman L. (2004). European Values at the Turn of the Millennium. Brill, Leiden. 
 
Arts W., van Oorshot W. (2005). Social Capital of European Welfare States: the Crowding Out 
Hypothesis Revisited. Journalof European Social Policy, 15(1): 5–26; 
 
Arts W., van Oorshot W., Gelissen J. (2006). Social Capital in Europe: Measurement, and Social 
and Regional Distribution of a multi-faceted phenomenon. CCWS Working Paper 44, Aalborg 
University; 
 
Bacon C. (2005). Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, and Specialty Coffees 
Reduce Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua? World Development, Oxford 
33(3): 497-511; 
 
Barro R. J. (1998). Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. The 
Economic Journal 108(450): 1607-1609;  
 
Bartkowsky J., Jasińska-Kania A. (2004).Voluntary Organizations and the Development of Civil 
Society. In Arts, W. and Halman L. (2004). European Values at the Turn of the Millennium. Brill, 
Leiden, pp. 109-138. 
 
Becchetti L.,  Costantino M. (2008). Fair Trade on marginalized producers: an impact analysis on 
Kenyan farmers, working paper, World Development Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 823–842. 
 
Becchetti L. Costantino M. Portale E., (2007). Human capital, externalities and tourism: three 
unexplored sides of the impact of FT affiliation on primary producers, CEIS working paper n. 262  
 
Becchetti L., Huybrechts B. (2008). The dynamics of Fair Trade as a mixed-form market. CEIS 
working paper, Journal of Business Ethics, (forth.); 
 
Becchetti L., Rosati F. (2007), Globalisation and the death of distance in social preferences and 
inequity  aversion:  empirical  evidence  from  a  pilot  study  on  fair trade  consumers.  The  World 
Economy 30 (5): 807-30; 
 
Becchetti L., Trovato G. (2005). The determinants of child labour: the role of primary product 
specialization. Labour 19(2): 237-271; 
 
Becchetti  L.,  Solferino  N.  (2008).  On  ethical  product  differentiation,  Economia  e  Politica 
Industriale, (forth.); 
   25 
Becchetti  L.,  Pace  N.  (2006).  The  Valorization  of  Human  Capital  as  a  Key  Element  of 
Competitiveness:  The  Trust  Game  Corporation  Perspective,  Corporate  Social  Responsibility 
(CSR) Paper 4; 
 
Berggren N., Jordahl H. (2006). Free to Trust: Economic Freedom and Social Capital. Kyklos, 
59(2): 141-169; 
 
Bird,  K.  and  D.  Hughes  (1997).  Ethical  Consumerism:  The  Case  of  “Fairly-traded”  Coffee, 
Business Ethics: A European Review, 6(3):159–67; 
 
Brown L.D., Ashman D., (1996). Participation, social capital and intersectoral problem solving, 
African and Asian cases. World Development 24(6): 1467-79; 
 
Castro J.E. (2001a). Impact assessment of Oxfam's fair trade activities. The case of Productores de 
miel Flor de Campanilla. Oxford: Oxfam. 
 
Castro J.E. (2001b). Impact assessment of Oxfam's fair trade activities. The case of COPAVIC. 
Oxford: Oxfam; 
 
Coleman  J.  S.  (1988).  Social  capital  in  the  creation  of  human  capital.  American  Journal  of 
Sociology,  94(S1): 95 – 120; 
 
Costa D. L., Kahn M. E., (2003). Understanding the decline in social capital. 1952-1998, Kyklos, 
56: 17-46; 
 
Deaton A., Paxson C. (1998). Economies of Scale, Household Size and the Demand for Food. 
Journal of Political Economy 106(5): 897-930; 
 
Delhey J., Newton K. (2005). Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Patterns 
or Nordic Exceptionalism. European Sociological Review 21(4): 311–327; 
 
Demos & Pi/Coop (2004). Osservatorio sul Capitale sociale Virtù e valori degli italiani, Indagine; 
 
Denny K. (2003). The Effects of Human Capital on Social Capital: A Cross-Country Analysis. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper 16;  
 
De Pelsmacker P., Driesen L., Rayp G. (2003). Are Fair Trade Labels Good Business? Ethics and 
Coffee Buying Intentions. Working Paper (University of Ghent); 
 
Easterly W. (2000). Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict?. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 49(4):687-706;  
 
Easterly W., Levine R. (1997). Africa's growth tragedy: Policies and Ethnic divisions. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics CXII(4): 1203-1250; 
 
Easterly  W.,  Ritzen  J.,  Woolcock  M.  (2000).  On  ‘good’  politicians  and  ‘bad’policies:  social 
cohesion,  institutions,  and  growth.  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  2448,  World  Bank, 
Washington DC; 
 
Fair Trade Advocacy Office (2005a). Fair Trade rules! 
URL=<http://www.ifat.org/downloads/advocacy/FairTradeRules_oct%202005.pdf>. Brussels;   26 
 
Fair Trade Advocacy Office (2005b). Fair Trade in Europe (2005). 
URL=<http://www.fairtrade.net/uploads/media/FairTradeinEurope2005.pdf>. Brussels; 
 
Fox J. (1996). How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in 
Rural Mexico. World Development 24(6):1089-1103; 
 
Fullenkamp  C.,  Chami  R.  (2002).  Trust  as  a  means  of  improving  corporate  governance  and 
efficiency. IMF Working Paper, WP/02/33, International Monetary Found February 
Glaeser E. L., La Porta R., Florencio Lopez-de-Silane and Andrei Shleifer (2004). Do Institutions 
Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, 9(3): 271-303, 09;  
Glaeser E. L., Laibson D., Sacerdote B. (2002). The Economic Approach to Social Capital. The 
Economic Journal 112: F437–F458; 
 
Greene W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis: 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall; 
 
Gradstein  M.,  Justman  M.  (2002).  Education,  Social  Cohesion  and  Economic  Growth.  The 
American Economic Review, 92(4): 1192-1204(13); 
 
Gradstein M. (2003). The Political Economy of Public Spending on Education, Inequality, and 
Growth. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3162; 
 
Halman L., Luijkx R. (2006). Social Capital in Contemporary Europe: Evidence from the 
European Social Survey. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 5(1):65–90; 
 
Hayes M. (2004). Strategic management implication of the ethical consumer. 
URL=<http://www.fairtraderesearch.org>; 
 
Helliwell J. F., Putnam R. D. (1999). Education and Social Capital. NBER Working Paper Series, 
No. 7121; 
 
Hirsch F. (1976). Social Limits to Growth. A Twentieth Century Fund Study, Cambridge, Mass. 
And London, England, Harvard University Press; 
 
Hulme D., Mosley P. (1996). Finance against poverty, Vol I- II, Routledge, London & New York. 
 
Knack S., Keefer P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4):1251-1288; 
 
Knack S., Zak P. J. (2001). Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and Economic 
Development. Supreme Court Economic Review (Forth.); 
 
Krishna  A.,  Uphoff  N.  (1999).  Mapping  and  Measuring  Social  Capital:  A  Conceptual  and 
Empirical Study of Collective Action for Conserving and Developing Watersheds in Rajasthan, 
India Social Capital Initiative Project, Working Paper 13, The World Bank 
 
La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1997). Trust in Large Organizations. 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 87(2): 333–338; 
   27 
La Porta R., Lopez de Silanes F., A. Shleifer, Vishny R. (1999). The Quality of Government. 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1): 222-79; 
 
Leclair  M.  S.  (2002).  Fighting  the  tide:  Alternative  trade  organizations  in  the  era  of 
global free trade. World Development 30(7): 1099–1122; 
 
Levi  M.  (1996).  Social  and  Unsocial  Capital:  A  Review  Essay  of  Robert  Putnam’s  Making 
Democracy Work. Politics & Society 24(1): 45-55; 
 
Maddala G. S. (1983). Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 
 
Maseland R., De Vaal A. (2002). How Fair is Fair Trade? De Economist 150(3): 251-272; 
 
Montalvo J. G., M. Reynal-Querol (2005a). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict and civil wars. 
American Economic Review 95 (3): 796-816; 
 
Montalvo J. G., M. Reynal-Querol (2005b). Ethnic Diversity and Economic Development. Journal 
of Development Economics, 76: 293-323; 
 
Moore G. (2004). The Fair Trade Movement: parameters, issues and future research. Journal of 
Business Ethics 53(1-2): 73-86; 
 
Olson  M.  (1971),  The  Logic  of  Collective  Action:  Public  Goods  and  the  Theory  of  Groups. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 
 
Ostrom E. (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14 (3): 137-158; 
 
Paldam  M.  (2000).  Social  Capital:  One  or  Many?  Definition  and  Measurement.  Journal  of 
Economic Surveys 14(5): 629–653; 
 
Pariente W. (2000). The impact of fair trade on a coffee cooperative in Costa Rica. A producers 
behaviour approach. Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne; 
 
Polanyi K. (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
Beacon Press: Boston; 
 
Putnam R. D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Redfern A., Snedker P. (2002). Creating market opportunities for small enterprises: experiences 
of the fair trade movement. ILO, Geneva. 
 
Rose R. (2000). Getting things done in antimodern society: Social capital networks in Russia, in 
Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Ed. Dasgupta and Serageldin, The World Bank; 
 
Rothstein B., Stolle D. (2003). Social Capital, Impartiality, and the Welfare State: An Institutional 
Approach. In M.Hooghe and D. Stolle (eds.) Generating Social Capital, Palgrave, pp. 141–156. 
   28 
Schiff M. (1999). Labor Market Integration in the Presence of Social Capital. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 222, Washington, DC, The World Bank; 
 
Soroka S. N., Helliwell J. F., Johnston R. (2003). Measuring and Modelling Trust. In Kay F. and 
Johnston R. (eds) Diversity, Social Capital and the Welfare State. Vancouver, BC. University of 
British Columbia Press. 
 
Stolle D., Rochon T. R. (1998). Are all associations alike? Member diversity, associational type, 
and the creation of social capital. American Behavioral Scientist 42: 47–65; 
 
Whiteley P. (1999). The Origins of Social Capital. In Van Deth J.W., Maraffi M., Whiteley P. 







































   29 
Table 1. Characteristics of the four sample groups 
 
  Bio farmers  Conversion farmers  Onlyfruit farmers  Control farmers 
 
Have you signed a contract 
with MERU? 
YES  YES  NO  NO 
Are you organic farmers ?  YES  CONVERTING TO  NO  NO 
Share of products sold to 
Meru 
60  55  38  0 
Do you sell fruits to Meru?  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Do you receive services from  
Meru*? 
YES  YES  NO  NO 
Do you receive benefits from 
FT ? 
YES**  YES**  YES**  NO 
Average years of trade 
relationship with the Meru 
organisation*** 
13.3  1.1  2.8  0 
 
Group  legend:  Bio:  certified  organic  farmers  with  long-term  affiliation  to  Meru  Herbs  and  access  to  FT  export 
channels. Conversion: Meru Herbs members of recent affiliation undergoing conversion towards organic certification. 
Onlyfruit: non-affiliated farmers selling fruit to Meru Herbs. Control: farmers with no commercial relationship with 
Meru or FT who share the same productive environment and advantages of the local irrigation infrastructure with 
affiliated farmers. 
* Complimentary seeds and organic fertiliser to organic farmers; ii) sale of trees for production at subsidised prices; 
iii) complimentary formation courses for the implementation of organic farming techniques and iv) engagement of one 
of Meru employees (the Farmer manager) to the task of supervising and providing technical assistance to the affiliated 
farmers. 
** Product diversification, price stabilisation and price premium in proportion to the amount sold to Meru Herbs. 
*** Years of affiliation for Bio and Conversion farmers, years of trade relationship for Onlyfruit farmers. 
Source: Becchetti and Gianfreda (2008) 
 
 










0 years  0  -  -  -  100.00  25.00  25.00 
1  -  93.33  40.00  -  33.33  58.33 
2  -  6.67  13.33  -  5.00  63.33 
3  -  -  30.00  -  7.50  70.83  from 1 to 6 
years  4  3.33  -  6.67  -  2.50  73.33 
9  3.33  -  6.67  -  2.50  75.83 
10  3.33  -  -  -  0.83  76.67 
11  -  -  3.33  -  0.83  77.50 
13  3.33  -  -  -  0.83  78.33  more than 6 
years  14  86.67  -  -  -  21.67  100.00 
  
N. of 
Respondents  30  30  30  30  120   
 
Group legend (see group legend in Table 1). 
** N. of group components 
*** Percent and Cumulative percent values of affiliation of the whole sample.   
Table 3. Variable legend 
 
WORKYEAR  Number of years the respondents have been affiliated to the project 
MAN  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent is a man and 0 otherwise 
CATHOLIC  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent is Catholic and 0 otherwise 
EDUCATION  Number of schooling years 
TOTALINCOME  Sum of the respondents’ income both from main and second activity 
INVESTINEDUCATION  Variable measuring intensity of the respondent’s investment in sons' education  
SONS  Number of the respondent’s sons  
AGE  Respondent’s age 
KIKUYU  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent is affiliated to the Kikuyu ethnic group 
MARRIED  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent is married and 0 otherwise 
MAINACTAGR  Dummy takes the value of 1 if agriculture is the respondents’ main activity and 0 otherwise 
DURABLERECBOUGHT   Sum of durables bought during the previous two  years 
DIETARY 
Average consumption frequency of the following food items:  
ugali. chapati. rice. maize. beans. eggs. milk. chicken. other meat. fish. potatoes. greens. fresh fruit  in which descending values  
(from a maximum of 5 to a minimum of 1)  have been given to the following modalities of consumption  
(more than once a day, once a day, once every three days, once a week, rarely, never)  
VOTELASTELECTION  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent voted in the last year election 
TRUSTGOVNOT  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent does not trust the government and 0 otherwise 
TRUSTPARTYNOT  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent does not trust political parties and 0 otherwise 
TRUSTUNIONNOT  Dummy takes the value of 1 if the respondent does not trust unions and 0 otherwise 
TRUSTPARTY  Answer to the question: do you trust political parties? very much=3, quite a lot=2, a little=1, not at all=0  
TRUSTGOV  Answer to the question: do you trust the government? very much=3, quite a lot=2, a little=1, not at all=0 
TRUSTUNION  Answer to the question: do you trust trade unions? very much=3, quite a lot=2, a little=1, not at all=0 
 
 
Table 4. Basic characteristics of the three categories of affiliation considered 
* In Kenyan Shillings. 






   Total sample  No affiliation  1-6 year affiliation  more than 6 year affiliation 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
Equivalised monthly 
earnings**  2048.831  8685.59  764.0341  922.13  1416.935  1669.044  4410.491  16853.01 
Schooling years  5.84  5.16  6.32  5.24  6.69  5.34  3.69  4.18 
Age  43.99  14.71  37.83  14.77  44.64  14.47  48.38  13.62 
No. of children  2.79  2.83  1.93  2.20  2.96  2.65  3.24  3.53 
Hectares  6.01  10.74  6.93  8.82  3.78  1.08  9.28  1.15 
Employees hired in 
harvesting season  1.65  2.39  .733   1.048   1.90  2.94  1.38  1.63    
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of basic variables used 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Workyear  120  4.32  5.57  0  14 
Man  120  0.49  0.50  0  1 
Catholic  120  0.53  0.50  0  1 
Education  115  5.84  5.16  0  16 
Totalincome  115  5224.50  9455.1  500  83333 
Investineducation  92  3.33  1.75  0  5 
Sons  112  2.80  2.83  0  10 
Age  120  44.00  14.71  22  93 
Kikuyu  120  0.10  0.28  0  1 
Married  120  0.90  0.28  0  1 
Mainactagr  119  0.80  0.42  0  1 
Durablerecbought   120  1.00  0.98  0  4 
Dietary  120  2.30  0.41  0  3.2 
Votelastelection*  120  0.84  0.37  0  1 
Trustgovnot  120  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Trustpartynot  120  0.54  0.50  0  1 
Trustunionnot  120  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Trustparty  120  0.88  1.09  0  3 
Trustgov  120  2.18  1.02  0  3 
Trustunion  120  1.43  1.16  0  3 
* percent values 
 
 
Table 6. The relationship between affiliation years and indicators of “generalised” trust  
 












Mistrust in political 
parties* 
 
58.62  55.93  46.87 
Mistrust in trade 
unions* 
 
37.93  30.50  25.00 
Voter turnout**  68.96  86.44  93.75 
       
* Percent of respondents declaring no trust at all. 
** Percent of group members who voted in last year election 
 
    
Table 7. The effect of FT affiliation years on “generalised trust” indicators 
 
 
No trust at all in 
the Government  
No trust at all in 
Political parties  
No trust at all in 
Trade unions   
Index of Generalised 
Trust* 
Workyear  -0.44350862  -0.17231455  -0.2211632  0.0586246 
  (-1.96)  (-2.76)  (-2.88)  (3.42) 
Onlyfruit  -2.1659515  -1.39626  -1.2537129  0.23877494 
  (-1.12)  (-1.65)  (-1.47)  (1.24) 
Sons  -0.19718266  -0.15847123  0.16583921  0.00080784 
  (-0.89)  (-1.2)  (1.23)  (0.02) 
Man  0.65333527  -0.73286262  0.4633581  -0.04347177 
  (0.35)  (-1.05)  (0.59)  (-0.27) 
Catholic  3.6288725  -0.24050868  0.42807661  -0.08910078 
  (3.57)  (-0.36)  (0.58)  (-0.57) 
Education  -0.40919378  -0.06518861  -0.04258411  0.01498371 
  (-1.65)  (-0.92)  (-0.56)  (0.73) 
Totalincome  0.00001819  0.00003736  -0.00005469  -0.00000379 
  (0.58)  (0.83)  (-0.82)  (-0.51) 
Investineducation  -0.09953622  0.03046515  0.02240751  -0.01953395 
  (-0.19)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (-0.41) 
Age  0.12060452  0.07615741  -0.00934866  0.01448245 
  (2.22)  (1.88)  (-0.29)  (1.84) 
Mainactagr  -3.6066126  -0.13200154  0.58500122  0.10775598 
  (-1.88)  (-0.15)  (0.48)  (0.45) 
Durablerec~t  0.36914427  -0.10310452  0.03787527  -0.00308306 
  (0.65)  (-0.33)  (0.13)  (-0.04) 
Dietary  -0.77129306  0.0309636  -1.2949429  0.27837129 
  (-0.38)  (0.04)  (-1.23)  (1.19) 
Kikuyu    0.54315332  0.05170432  -0.10798219 
    (0.55)  (0.06)  (-0.43) 
Married      -0.59178795  0.77566227 
      (-0.44)  (1.66) 
Control        -0.37742125 
        (-0.22) 
Constant  -2.1747649  -0.617827  3.2096106  0.39175293 
  (-0.7)  (-0.26)  (1.02)  (0.33) 
Control         
Sons        -0.12728085 
        (-1.18) 
Education        -0.04859118 
        (-0.95) 
Totalincome        -0.00004624 
        (-0.78) 
Age        -0.04110233 
        (-1.19) 
Constant        1.3455784 
        (0.98) 
Wald χ
2  27.63  18.11  20.54  27.32 
Prob > χ
2  (0.0063)  (0.1536)  (0.114)  (0.0263) 
Pseudo R
2  0.4536  0.203  0.2247   
Log L  -9.6750098  -39.887141  -35.841682  -92.114223 
         
*Unweighted average of trust in government, political parties and trade unions.                                                          